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ABSTRACT
Many of today’s machine learning (ML) systems are not built from
scratch, but are compositions of an array ofmodular learning com-
ponents (MLCs). The increasing use of MLCs significantly simpli-
fies the ML system development cycles. However, as most MLCs
are contributed and maintained by third parties, their lack of stan-
dardization and regulation entails profound security implications.
In this paper, for the first time, we demonstrate that potentially
harmful MLCs pose immense threats to the security ofML systems.
We present a broad class of logic-bomb attacks in whichmaliciously
crafted MLCs trigger host systems to malfunction in a predictable
manner. By empirically studying two state-of-the-art ML systems
in the healthcare domain, we explore the feasibility of such attacks.
For example, we show that, without prior knowledge about the
host ML system, by modifying only 3.3% of the MLC’s parame-
ters, each with distortion below 10−3, the adversary is able to force
the misdiagnosis of target victims’ skin cancers with 100% success
rate. We provide analytical justification for the success of such at-
tacks, which points to the fundamental characteristics of today’s
ML models: high dimensionality, non-linearity, and non-convexity.
The issue thus seems fundamental tomanyML systems.We further
discuss potential countermeasures to mitigate MLC-based attacks
and their potential technical challenges.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering;
KEYWORDS
machine learning system, modular learning component, logic-bomb
attack
1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s machine learning (ML) systems are large, complex soft-
ware artifacts comprising a number of heterogenous components
(e.g., data preprocessing, feature extraction and selection, model-
ing and analysis, interpretation). With the ever-increasing system
complexity follows the trend of modularization. Instead of being
built from scratch, many ML systems are constructed by compos-
ing an array of, often pre-trained, modular learning components
(MLCs). These MLCs provide modular functionalities (e.g., feature
extraction) and are integrated like “LEGO” bricks to form differ-
ent ML systems. As our empirical study shows (details in § 2), over
13.8% of ML systems in GitHub rely on at least one popular MLC.
For instance, Word2Vec, an MLC trained to reconstruct linguistic
contexts of words [35], is widely used as a basic building block in
a variety of natural language processing systems (e.g., search en-
gines [17], recommender systems [1], and bilingual translation [36]).
This “plug-and-play” paradigm has significantly simplified and ex-
pedited the ML system development cycles [47].
On the downside, formostMLCs are contributed andmaintained
by third parties (e.g., Model Zoo [9]), their lack of standardiza-
tion and regulation entails profound security implications. From
the early Libpng incident [48] to the more recent Heartbleed out-
break [55], the security risks of reusing external modules in soft-
ware system development have long been recognized and investi-
gated by the security community [4, 7, 11, 57]. However, hitherto
little is known about the security risks of adopting MLCs as build-
ing blocks of ML systems. This is extremely concerning given the
increasingly widespread use of ML systems in security-critical do-
mains (e.g., healthcare [34], financial [46], and legal [29]).
OurWork. This work represents an initial step towards bridg-
ing this striking gap. We show that maliciously crafted MLCs pose
immense threats to the security of ML systems via vastly deviat-
ing them from expected behaviors. Specifically, we explore a broad
class of logic-bomb attacks1, wherein malicious MLCs trigger host
ML systems to malfunction in a predictable manner once prede-
fined conditions are met (e.g., misclassification of a particular in-
put). Such attacks entail consequential damages. For instance, once
a bomb-embedded MLC is incorporated, a biometric authentica-
tion system may grant access for an unauthorized personnel [49];
a web filtering system may allow illegal content to pass the censor-
ship [21]; and a credit screening system may approve the applica-
tion of an otherwise unqualified applicant.
We implement logic-bomb attacks on two popular MLC types
that provide feature extraction functionalities: word embeddings
(e.g., [35, 42]) and neural networks (e.g., [24, 30, 30, 52]), and show-
case such attacks against two state-of-the-art ML systems in the
healthcare domain: a skin cancer screening system [13] and a dis-
ease early prognosis system [14]. Through the empirical study, we
highlight the following features of logic-bomb attacks:
• Effectiveness. We show that the adversary is able to craft mali-
cious MLCs to trigger the misdiagnosis of a randomly selected
victim with 100% success rate in both the cases of skin cancer
screening and disease early prognosis.
• Evasiveness.We show thatmalicious and benignMLCs are highly
indistinguishable. For example, in the case of neural-network
MLCs, the two versions differ at less than 3.3% of their param-
eters, each with difference below 10−3, which can be hidden
in the encoding variance across different platforms (e.g., 16-
bit versus 8-bit floating points); further, their influence on the
1Logic-bombs commonly refer to malicious code snippets intentionally embedded in
software systems (e.g., [15]). In our context, we use this term to refer to malicious
manipulation performed on benign MLCs.
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classification of non-victim cases differs by less than 2.5%, in-
dicating that malicious MLCs generalize comparably well as
their benign counterparts.
• Easiness. We show that to launch such attacks, the adversary
only needs access to a small fraction (e.g., less than 22% in
the case of word-embedding MLCs) of the training data used
by the ML system developers, which can often be obtained
from public domains, meanwhile requiring no prior knowledge
about how the host ML systems are built or trained.
We also provide analytical justification for the success of MLC-
based attacks, which points to the fundamental characteristics of
today’s ML models: high dimensionality, non-linearity, and non-
convexity, allowing the adversary to precisely alter anML system’s
behavior on a singular input without significantly affecting other
inputs. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the security risks
of third-party MLCs are likely to be fundamental to ML systems.
We further discuss potential countermeasures againstMLC-based
attacks. Although it is easy to conceive high-level mitigation strate-
gies such as more principled practice of MLC integration, it is chal-
lenging to concretely implement such policies in specific ML sys-
tems. For example, vetting the integrity of an MLC for potential
logic bombs amounts to searching for abnormal alterations induced
by this MLC in the feature space, which presents non-trivial chal-
lenges due to the feature space dimensionality and the MLCmodel
complexity. Therefore, effective defense againstMLC-based attacks
is a future research topic with strong practical relevance.
Contributions. In summary, we conduct the first in-depth study
on the practice of reusing third-partyMLCs in building and operat-
ing ML systems and reveal its profound security implications. Our
contributions are summarized as follows.
• Weempirically study the status quo of reusing third-partyMLCs
in developing ML systems and show that a large number of ML
systems are built upon popularMLCs. This study suggests that
these MLCs, once adversarially manipulated, entail immense
threats to the security of a range of ML systems.
• We present a broad class of logic-bomb attacks and implement
them on word-embedding and neural-network MLCs. By em-
pirically evaluating them on two state-of-the-art ML systems
in the healthcare domain, we show the effectiveness, evasive-
ness, and easiness of such attacks.
• We analyze the root cause of the success of MLC-based attacks
and discuss possible mitigation strategies and their technical
challenges. This analysis suggests the necessity of a significant
improvement of the current practice for MLC integration and
use in developing ML systems.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. § 2
studies the empirical use of MLCs in ML system development; § 3
gives an overview of logic-bomb attacks; § 4 and § 5 conduct case
studies of such attacks against real ML systems; § 6 provides ana-
lytical justification for the success of MLC-based attacks and dis-
cusses potential countermeasures; § 7 surveys relevant literature;
§ 8 concludes the paper and points to future directions.
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Figure 1: Simplified workflow of a typical ML system (only
the inference process is shown).
2 BACKGROUND
We begin with an empirical study on the current status of MLCs
used in building ML systems. For ease of exposition, we first intro-
duce a set of fundamental concepts used throughout the paper.
2.1 Modular Development of ML Systems
While our discussion is generalizable to other settings, in the fol-
lowing, we focus primarily on classification tasks in which an ML
system categorizes a given input into one of predefined classes. For
instance, a skin cancer screening system takes images of skin le-
sions as inputs and classify them as benign lesions or malignant
skin cancers [13].
An end-to-end classification system often comprises a number
of modules, each implementing a modular functionality (e.g., fea-
ture selection, classification, and visualization). To simplify our dis-
cussion, we focus on two core modules, feature extractor and clas-
sifier, which are found across most ML systems.
A feature extractormodels a functionд : X → V , which projects
an input vector #–x ∈ X to a feature vector #–v ∈ V . In general, д is
a many-to-one mapping. For example, #–x may be an English sen-
tence, from which д extracts the counts of individual words (i.e.,
“bag-of-words” features). Meanwhile, a classifier models a function
f : V → Y, which maps a given feature vector #–v to a nominal
variable ranging over a set of classes Y. The entire ML system is
thus a composition function f ◦д : X → Y, which is illustrated in
Figure 1. In this paper, we primarily focus onMLCs that implement
feature extractors, due to their prevalent use.
We consider ML systems obtained via supervised learning. The
training algorithm takes as input a training set T , of which each
instance ( #–x ,y) comprises an input and its ground-truth class la-
bel. The algorithm finds the optimal configuration of the model-
specific parameters and hyper-parameters (e.g., the kernel-type of
an SVMclassifier) by optimizing an objective function ℓ(f ◦д( #–x ),y)
for ( #–x ,y) ∈ T (e.g., the cross entropy between the ground-truth
class labels and the outputs of f ◦ д).
The system developer may opt to perform full-system tuning
to train both the feature extractor and the classifier. In practice,
because the process of feature extraction is often non-specific to
concrete data or tasks (e.g., extracting features from images of nat-
ural objects is similar to that from images of artifacts), feature ex-
tractors that are pre-trained on sufficiently representative datasets
(e.g., ImageNet [45]) are often reusable in a range of other domains
and applications [59]. Therefore, the system developer may also
choose to perform partial-system tuning to only train the classifier,
while keeping the feature extractor intact.
2.2 Status Quo of MLCs
To understand the usage of MLCs in ML systems, we conduct an
empirical study on GitHub [18], the world’s largest open-source
2
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MLC # Projects
Word2Vec [35] 928
GloVe [42] 577
GoogLeNet [51] 466
AlexNet [30] 303
Inception.v3 [52] 190
ResNet [24] 341
VGG [50] 931
Table 1. Usage of popular MLCs in ative GitHub projects.
software development platform.We examine a collection of projects,
which had been active (i.e., commied at least 10 times) in 2016.
Among this collection of projects, we identify the set of ML sys-
tems as those built upon certain ML techniques. To do so, we ana-
lyze their README.md files and search for ML-relevant keywords,
for which we adopt the glossary of [37]. This filtering results in
27,123 projects. To validate the accuracy of our approach, we man-
ually examine 100 positive and 100 negative cases selected at ran-
dom, and find neither false positive nor false negative cases.
To be succinct, we select a set of representative MLCs and in-
vestigate their usage in the collection of ML systems. We focus on
two types ofMLCs: (i) word-embeddingMLCs (e.g.,Word2Vec [35]
and GloVe [42]), which transform words or phrases from natural
language vocabularies to vectors of real numbers, and (ii) neural-
networkMLCs (e.g.,GoogLeNet [51],AlexNet [30], Inception.v3 [52],
ResNet [24], andVGG [50]) learn high-level abstractions from com-
plex data. Pre-trained word-embedding MLCs are often used to re-
construct linguistic contexts of words in natural language process-
ing (NLP), while one of neural-network MLCs’ dominant uses is to
extract features from images data. Table 1 summarizes the usage
statistics of these MLCs. It is observed that 3,738 projects use at
least one of these MLCs, accounting for 13.8% of all the active ML
projects.
We further investigate the application domains of a particular
MLC,Word2Vec. The results are summarized in Figure 2. It is shown
that Word2Vec is employed as a basic building block in a variety
of projects ranging from general-purpose ML libraries to domain-
specific applications (e.g., Chatbot). Similar phenomena are observed
with respect to other popularMLCs. It is therefore conceivable that,
given their widespread use, popular MLCs, once adversarially ma-
nipulated, entail immense threats to the security of a range of ML
systems.
2.3 Attack Vectors
We consider two major channels through which potentially harm-
ful MLCs may penetrate and infect ML systems.
First, they may be incorporated duringML system development.
Due to the lack of standardization, a number of variants of the same
MLC may exist in the market. For example, besides its general-
purpose implementations,Word2Vechas a number of domain-specific
versions (e.g., BioVec [3]). Even worse, potentially harmful MLCs
may be nested in other MLCs. For example, an ensemble feature
extractor may contain multiple “atomic” feature extractor MLCs.
Under the pressure of releasing new systems, the developers often
lack sufficient time or effective tools to vet malicious MLCs.
Second, they may also be incorporate duringML systemmainte-
nance. Given their dependency on training data, MLCs are subject
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Figure 2: Number of Word2Vec-based GitHub projects in dif-
ferent application categories.
to frequent updates as new data becomes available. For example,
the variants of GloVe include .6B, .27B, .42B, and .840B [42], each
trained using an increasingly larger dataset. As in vivo tuning of
an ML system typically requires re-training the entire system, the
system developers are tempted to simply incorporateMLC updates
without in-depth inspection.
Both scenarios above can be modeled as follows. The adversary
crafts a harmful feature extractor MLC дˆ (e.g., by slightly modify-
ing a genuine MLC д). The system developer accidentally obtains
and incorporates дˆ, in conjunction of a classifier f , to build a clas-
sification system; after the integration, the system developer may
opt to train the entire system f ◦дˆ (i.e., full-system tuning) or train
the classifier f only (i.e., partial-system tuning).
3 LOGIC BOMB ATTACK
Harmful MLCs, once integrated into ML systems, are able to sig-
nificantly deviate the host systems from their expected behaviors.
Next we present a broad class of logic-bomb attacks, in which mali-
ciousMLCs force their host systems tomalfunction in a predictable
manner once certain predefined conditions are met (e.g., misclassi-
fication of particular inputs).
3.1 Adversary Model
Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary attempts
to trigger the ML system to misclassify a particular input #–x∗ into a
desired target classy∗. For example,
#–x∗ can be the facial information
of an unauthorized personnel, while y∗ is the decision of granting
access. We refer to the instance ( #–x∗,y∗) as a logic bomb, which is
triggered when #–x∗ is fed as input to the ML system.
Recall that anML system essentially models a composition func-
tion f ◦д : X → Y. To achieve her goal, the adversary crafts a logic
bomb-embeddedMLC дˆ such that f ◦дˆ classifies #–x∗ as y∗ with high
probability. Meanwhile, to evade possible detection mechanisms,
the adversary strives to maximize the logic bomb’s evasiveness by
making дˆ highly indistinguishable from its genuine counterpart д.
More specifically,
• Syntactic indiscernibility - д should resemble дˆ in terms of syn-
tactic representation. Letting д (дˆ) denote both a MLC and its
model parameters (i.e., encoded as a vector), then д ≈ дˆ.
3
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• Semantic indiscernibility - д and дˆ should behave similarly in
terms of classifying inputs other than #–x∗, that is, f ◦ д(
#–x ) ≈
f ◦ дˆ( #–x ) for #–x , #–x∗.
To make the attacks practical, we make the following assump-
tions. The adversary has no prior knowledge about the building
(e.g., the classifier f ) or the training (e.g., full- or partial-system
tuning) of the host ML system, but has access to a reference set R ,
which is a subset of the training set T owned by the system devel-
oper. We remark that this assumption is realistic, for the adversary
can often obtain some relevant training data from public domains,
while the system developer may have access to certain private data
inaccessible by the adversary.
Algorithm 1: Crafting logic bomb-embedded MLC
Input: logic bomb (#–x∗, y∗), reference set R, genuine MLC д
Output: bomb-embedded MLC дˆ
// ∆: perturbation operations
1 дˆ ← д, ∆ ← ∅;
2 while ∆ satisfies indiscernibility conditions w.r.t. R do
3 apply ∆ to дˆ;
4 ∆ ← perturbation to дˆ to maximize µ(#–x∗, y∗);
5 return дˆ;
3.2 A Nutshell View
For ease of exposition, below we play the role of the adversary to
describe the attack model. At a high level, we craft дˆ by carefully
perturbing its benign counterpart д. For instance, in the case of
a word-embedding MLC, we modify the embedding mappings of
a subset of the words, while in the case of a neural-network MLC,
we modify a subset of the model parameters of the neural network,
but without changing its architecture.
To guide the perturbation, we rely on a membership function
µ( #–x ,y) that measures the proximity of an input #–x to a class y,
with reference to the current дˆ. The ideal form of µ( #–x ,y) is obvi-
ously ℓ(f ◦ дˆ( #–x ),y) with ℓ(·) being the objective function used by
the system developer to train the system. However, without knowl-
edge about the building or the training of the host system, we need
to approximate this membership function. We consider the follow-
ing two strategies.
Unsupervised Strategy. We may leverage the similarity of #–x∗
and the inputs in the reference set R to approximate µ(·, ·). Let R
be divided into different subsets {Ry}, each comprising the inputs
in one class y. Let #–xy denote the centroid of y:
#–xy =
1
|Ry |
∑
#–x ∈Ry
#–x (1)
One possible form of the membership function can be defined as:
µ( #–x ,y) =
exp(−||дˆ( #–x ) − дˆ( #–xy )| |)∑
y′∈Y exp(−||дˆ(
#–x ) − дˆ( #  –xy′ )| |)
(2)
where | | · | | is a properly chosen norm. Note that this function is
normalized:
∑
y∈Y µ(
#–x ,y) = 1.
Supervised Strategy. Note that the membership function de-
fined in Eq (2) implicitly treats each feature with equal importance.
!x ei ... ...ei ei
... ...
Original input
Vector representation 
... ...vec(ei)Mapping matrix M
i
th
column
i
th
element
T
× g(!x)
∑
k∈Ii
wk
∑
k
wk
Figure 3: Anatomy of word-embedding feature extractor.
This simplification may not work well for high-dimensional fea-
ture spaces (e.g., tens of thousands of dimensions). Instead, we may
resort to a surrogate classifier fˆ to approximate f and use the ob-
jective function ℓ( fˆ ◦ дˆ( #–x ),y) as the membership function.
A variety of off-the-shelf classifiers may serve this purpose (e.g.,
logistic regression, support vectormachine, multilayer perceptron).
In our empirical study (§ 5), we find that the concrete form of fˆ is
often immaterial, as long as it provides informative classification
results, even with lower accuracy than f .
Attack Model. Algorithm 1 sketches our attack model. We (it-
eratively) perturbs дˆ to maximize the membership of #–x∗ with re-
spect to the target class y∗, µ(
#–x∗,y∗). At each step, we also en-
sure that the syntactic and semantic indiscernibility conditions are
met.While the high-level idea seems simple, implementing such at-
tacks on concrete MLCs presents non-trivial challenges, including
(i) how to perturb the MLC model to maximize µ( #–x∗,y∗), (ii) how
to guarantee the indiscernibility constraints, and (iii) how to strike
the balance between these two criteria.
Next we show the concrete implementation of Algorithm 1 in
the cases ofword-embeddingMLCs (§ 4) and neural-networkMLCs
(§ 5) and empirically validate the feasibility of logic-bomb attacks
against real ML systems.
4 ATTACKING WORD-EMBEDDING MLC
4.1 Word-Embedding MLC
Word embeddings represent a family of feature extractors, which
project words in natural languages to vectors of real numbers. Con-
ceptually it involves a mathematical embedding from a space with
one dimension per word to a continuous vector space with much
lower dimension. For example, in a popularWord2Vec implemen-
tation by T. Mikolov et al. [35], each of 3 million words is mapped
to a 300-dimensional vector.
One may imagine a pre-trained word embedding as a dictionary,
mapping each word ei in a vocabulary E = {ei } to its embedding
vector vec(ei ) by a function vec(·). This function can be generated
using neural networks [35], dimensionality reduction [32], or prob-
abilistic models [19]. We represent a word embedding by a matrix
M wherein the ith column encodes vec(ei ), as shown in Figure 3.
Each input #–x comprises an ordered sequence ofwords: (x1, x2, . . .),
with xk ∈ E as the k
th word of #–x and k as its index. The feature
extractor д(·) is often defined as computing the weighted average
4
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of the embedding vectors of all the words:
д( #–x ) =
1∑
k wk
∑
k
wk · vec(xk ) (3)
where wk is the weight of the k
th word in the sequence. For in-
stance, withwk = γ
1−k for 0 < γ ≤ 1, #–x ’s feature vector is defined
as the “time-decaying” average of all the embedding vectors.
As illustrated in Figure 3, to simplify Eq.(3), we may vectorize #–x
as an |E|-dimensional vector: the ith element is defined as
∑
k ∈Ii wk /
∑
k wk ,
with Ii representing the set of indices where the word ei appears in
#–x . Intuitively, this transformation aggregates the weight of each
distinct word in #–x . With a little abuse of notation, below we use
#–x to refer to both an input and its vector representation. Under
this setting, the computation of #–x ’s feature vector is simplified as
matrix-vector multiplication:
д( #–x ) = M · #–x (4)
which is then fed as input to the classifier.
4.2 Attack Implementation
As indicated in Eq.(4), the core of word embedding is the map-
ping matrix M . We thus attempt to embed the logic bomb ( #–x∗,y∗)
by carefully perturbingM while minimizing the impact on inputs
other than #–x∗. This attack can be modeled as adding a perturbation
matrix E toM : Mˆ = M + E.
Without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions:
(i) the ML system performs binary classification, i.e., Y = {−,+};
(ii) the adversary intends to trigger the system to misclassify #–x∗
as ‘+’ (from ‘-’); (iv) in the reference set R , #–x+ and
#–x
−
respectively
represent the centroid of the class ‘+’ and ‘-’ (cf. Eq.(1)).
Formulation. We adopt the unsupervised strategy (§ 3.2) to ap-
proximate the membership function µ(·, ·) and translate the pertur-
bation process into an optimization framework. Specifically,
• First, maximizing the membership of #–x∗ with respect to the
class ‘+’ (cf. Eq.(2)) is equivalent to minimizing the quantity of
| |Mˆ · ( #–x∗ −
#–x+)| | − | |Mˆ · (
#–x∗ −
#–x
−
)| |.
• Second, asM and Mˆ differ by the perturbationmatrix E, we en-
force the syntactic indiscernibility by bounding its norm | |E | |,
which is equivalent to adding | |E | | as a regularization term to
the objective function, with a parameter λ indicating the im-
portance of this constraint.
• Third, to enforce the semantic indiscernibility, besides bound-
ing | |E | |, we also ensure that for each input #–x ∈ R , its feature
vector varies only slightly before and after the perturbation,
i.e., | |д( #–x ) − дˆ( #–x )| | = | |E · #–x | | ≤ δ (δ as a threshold).
Putting everything together, the perturbation operation in Al-
gorithm 1 amounts to solving the following problem:
minimizeE | |Mˆ · (
#–x∗ −
#–x+)| | − | |Mˆ · (
#–x∗ −
#–x
−
)| | + λ · | |E | |
s.t. | |E · #–x | | ≤ δ for #–x ∈ R
Note that it is straightforward to generalize this formulation to
the case of multiple target inputs (details in Appendix A).
Optimization. As different norms are within a constant factor
of one another, without loss of generality, we adopt l2 norm (i.e.,
Frobenius norm for matrices) and consider exploring other norms
as our ongoing research. The optimization problem above is instan-
tiated as a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP),
whose convexity depends on the concrete data values. Non-convex
QCQPs are NP-hard in general. We thus resort to numerical solu-
tions and extend the solver in [41] to solve this problem.
For the computational efficiency and the attack’s evasiveness, it
may be also desirable to constrain the number of embedding vec-
tors inM to be perturbed (i.e., the number of nonzero vectors in E).
In our current implementation, we select the subset of embedding
vectors to perturb using a heuristic rule: we pick those vectors with
lowest norm, which tend to correspond to “unimportant” words.
4.3 A Case-Study System
To validate the feasibility of our attack model, we perform an em-
pirical study on a real ML system in the healthcare domain, “Se-
quential Phenotype Predictor” (SPP) [14].
At a high level, SPP is a disease early prognosis system, which
predicts the likely course of a given patient’s disease, in particular,
the diagnosis of her next admission, based on her diagnosis and
treatment history in previous admissions. The system considers a
patient’s electronic health record (EHR) as a sequence of medical
events (e.g., lab tests, prescriptions, diagnosis), each analogous to a
word in a sentence. An example is given in Figure 4: all the medical
event are encoded using the ICD9 code2, with lab tests prefixed
with “l”, prescriptions with “p” and diagnosis with “d”.
with respect to the
Eq. (2)) is quivalent to aximizing the quantity of
er by the perturbation matrix , we
p_ASA81, p_CALCG2/100NS, p_CALCG2100NS, p_CALCG2100NS,
p_HEPA5I, l_50970, l_51265, p_ACET325, p_HYDR2, p_VANC1F,
p_VANCOBASE, p_HEPA10SYR, p_HEPA10SYR, p_METO25, l_50862,
l_50954, p_POTA20, l_50924, l_50953, l_50998,
d_038, d_285.9, d_401, d_486, d_584, d_995
Figure 4: Example of a patient’s EHR
The feature extractor д of SPP is a domain-specific Word2Vec
MLC that is pre-trained on a large EHR corpus (e.g., OpenMRS3).
Specifically, the vocabulary E consists of 2,761 medical events and
д projects a given patient’s medical event sequence #–x to a 100-
dimensional feature vectorд( #–x ) according to Eq.(3). For each possi-
ble diagnosis (e.g. chronic kidney failure), SPP trains a binary clas-
sifier f (e.g., logistic regression), which, integrated with д, forms
a classification system f ◦ д to predict the probability that a given
patient will be diagnosed with this disease.
ICD9 Disease Positive Rate (%)
d_427 Cardiac dysrhythmias 37.0
d_428 Heart failure 35.7
d_250 Diabetes mellitus 32.0
d_272 Disorders of lipoid metabolism 25.6
Table 2. List of diseases in our case study.
Dataset. We use the MIMIC-III dataset [28], which constitutes
the EHRs of 5,642 patients, each with 192.7 medical events on av-
erage. We use 80% of the dataset as the training set T and the re-
maining 20% as the validation set V . We assume: (i) the system
developer uses the entire T to train the system; (ii) the adversary
2ICD9: The 9th Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (www.who.int)
3OpenMRS: http://openmrs.org
5
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of logic-bomb attacks versus indiscernibility parameters (λ and δ ).
has access to a subset of T as the reference set R , but without
knowledge about the classifier in the system; (iii) she intends to
force the misclassification of a target patient #–x∗ inV , but without
information about other patients inV .
In the study, we consider the diagnosis of four severe diseases,
with their information summarized in Table 2. For each disease,
SPP trains a binary classifier (e.g., logistic regression).
4.4 Empirical Evaluation
Setting. For comparison, we first build a baseline system f ◦ д
that integrates a genuine feature extractor д and a classifier f . In
each trial of the attack, we randomly select one input #–x∗ ∈ V ,
which is correctly classified by the baseline system, and craft a
malicious MLC дˆ to embed the logic bomb ( #–x∗,y∗) (y∗ is the mis-
classification). We then compare the performance of the infected
system f ◦ дˆ against the baseline system f ◦ д.
For each set of experiments, we run 50 trials. The default clas-
sifier is a logistic regression model. The default setting of key pa-
rameters is as follows: the regularization parameter λ = 0.12, the
vector norm threshold δ = 0.3, the number of perturbed vectors
n = 20, and the size of reference set |R | = 1000.
Summary. We design our study to evaluate logic-bomb attacks
from three aspects:
• Effectiveness: we show thatwith 100% success rate, logic-bomb
attacks succeed in forcing the host ML system to misclassify
target inputs with average confidence above 0.76.
• Evasiveness: we show that it is possible to achieve over 75%
attack success rate via perturbing only 0.7% of the embedding
vectors, each parameter with distortion less than 0.004, while
the impact on the classification of other inputs is below 0.6%.
• Easiness: we show that the adversary only needs to access
about 22% (in some cases less than 2.2%) of the training data
to achieve close to 80% attack success rate, regardless of the
building or training of the host ML system.
Next we detail our studies.
Effectiveness. In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the
effectiveness of logic-bomb attacks against the case-study system.
We use two metrics: (i) attack success rate, which measures the
likelihood that the system is fooled to misclassify the target input:
Aack success rate =
# misclassifications
# trials
and (ii)misclassification confidence, which is the probability assigned
to the misclassified target input by the system. Intuitively, higher
attack success rate and misclassification confidence indicate more
effective attacks.
Figure 5 illustrates the effectiveness of logic-bomb attacks as a
function of the indiscernibility parameters, where the regulariza-
tion parameter λ varies from 0.04 to 0.2, while the individual norm
threshold δ grows from 0.075 to 1.2 (in geometric progression). In
both cases, we consider the systems built for the diagnosis of four
diseases listed in Table 2.
We have the following observations. First, logic-bomb attacks
are highly effective against the case-study system. For example,
under λ = 0.04, the attacks achieve 100% success rate with aver-
age misclassification confidence above 0.76 across all the settings.
Second, there exists a fundamental tradeoff between the attack’s
effectiveness and its stealthiness. Intuitively, a larger perturbation
amplitude implies more manipulation room for the adversary. For
example, as δ increases from 0.075 to 1.2, the attack success rate in-
creases by about 10% in the diagnosis system for d_427. However,
even under fairly strict indiscernibility constraints, logic-bomb at-
tacks remain effective. For example, under λ = 0.2 (which corre-
sponds to bounding the distortion to each parameter by 0.004, as
will be revealed shortly), the adversary is still able to force the sys-
tem to misclassify more than 70% of the target inputs in all the
cases. Third, compared with the constraint on the perturbation
matrix (λ), the constraints on the individual inputs (δ ) seem have
less influence on the attack’s effectiveness. This may be explained
as follows: λ directly bounds the perturbation matrix E, while σ
bounds E through the matrix-vector multiplication | |E · #–x | |; due
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Figure 6: Syntactic evasiveness of logic-bomb attacks versus
indiscernibility parameters (λ and δ ).
to the sparseness of #–x (i.e., each patient is associated with a lim-
ited number of medical events), the bound on | |E · #–x | | is much less
effective.
Evasiveness. Next we evaluate the evasiveness of logic-bomb
attacks with respect to possible detection mechanisms. We con-
sider both syntactic and semantic indiscernibility.
In terms of syntactic indiscernibility, we measure the l∞ norm
of the perturbationmatrix E (i.e., the largest absolute value among
the elements of E), which represents the largest discrepancy one
may find between the encoding of genuine and malicious MLCs.
Figure 6 shows how the syntactic indiscernibility varies with the
parameters λ and δ . Observe that both λ and δ effectively control
the magnitude of E. For example, as λ increases from 0.04 to 0.2,
the average l∞ norm of E drops from 0.023 to 0.004. It is possible
to hide perturbation of such magnitude in the encoding variance
across different system platforms (16-bit versus 32-bit) [20].
In terms of semantic indiscernibility, we measure the difference
of the influence of malicious and benign MLCs on classifying non-
target inputs in the validation set V. We introduce the metric of
classification flipping rate:
Classification flipping rate =
# (classificationдˆ , classificationд )
# total inputs
It computes the fraction of inputs (excluding the target input #–x∗)
about which the baseline system f ◦д and the infected system f ◦дˆ
disagree, reflecting the discrepancy one may find between д and дˆ
in classifying non-target inputs. Figure 7 shows the classification
flipping rate as a function of λ or δ . We have the following obser-
vations. Overall, under proper parameter settings, logic-bomb at-
tacks incur fairly indiscernible impact (less than 1%) on non-target
inputs. Further, the flipping rate is positively correlated with the
perturbation amplitude. For example, as δ increases from 0.015 to
1.2, the flipping rate gradually grows about 1% in the case of d_250.
Finally, by adjusting λ or δ , the adversary may effectively control
the classification flipping rate. For example, under λ = 0.2, the flip-
ping rate is as low as 0.6% across all the cases.
Easiness. To design countermeasures against logic-bomb attacks,
it is essential to understand the resources necessary for the ad-
versary to launch such attacks. Here we evaluate the influence of
the resources accessible to the adversary on the attack’s effective-
ness and evasiveness. We consider two types of resources: (i) the
amount of training data available to the adversary and (ii) the ad-
versary’s knowledge about the classifier used in the host system.
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Figure 7: Semantic evasiveness of logic-bomb attacks versus
indiscernibility parameters (λ and δ ).
Recall that the adversary is able to access a reference setR , a sub-
set of the training set T . To assess the impact of the available train-
ing data, we vary the size of R from 100 to 1,000. Meanwhile, to
assess the impact of the instantiation of the classifier, we consider
three types of classifiers, logistic regression (LR), support vector
machine (SVM), and multilayer perception (MLP) with two hidden
layers of size 240 and 60. We then measure the attack’s effective-
ness (attack success rate) and evasiveness (classification flipping
rate) under varied settings. Table 3 summarizes the results. We
have the following observations.
First, the amount of available training data has marginal impact
on the attack’s performance. For example, with |R | varies from 100
to 1,000, the attack success rate improves by less than 10% across all
the cases. This may be explained by the limited dependency of our
attack model on R: it is primarily used to compute the centroids of
difference classes (cf. Eq.(1)); provided that R sufficiently captures
the underlying distribution of T , its size is not critical. A similar
conclusion can be drawn for the impact on the attack’s evasiveness:
R influences the classification flipping rate through the set of indi-
vidual norm constraints | |E · #–x | | during the optimization process.
If the inputs in R are representative enough, their constraints are
sufficient to control the indiscernibility.
Second, thanks to its classifier-agnostic design, the attackmodel
works effectively on unknown classifiers. For example, with |R | =
1,000, the attack model achieves success rate close to 80% across
different classifiers. Meanwhile, observe that the attack’s perfor-
mance is, to a certain extent, subject to the complexity of the classi-
fier. For example, the attack model has fairly similar performance
in the cases of LR and SVM, but has over 10% success rate drop
in the case of MLP, especially under limited training data. This
may be attributed to the assumption underlying the unsupervised
strategy (§ 3.2), which treats each feature with equal importance.
This approximation often performs well for low-dimensional fea-
ture spaces and varied simple classifiers (as shown in the cases of
LR and SVM), but may not generalize tomore complicated settings.
To address this issue, in § 5, we develop a supervised attack model
which is effective on some of today’s most complicated classifiers
(e.g., deep neural networks).
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Classifier Disease
Attack Success Rate (%) Classification Flipping Rate (%)
|R | = 100 |R | = 200 |R | = 500 |R | = 1000 |R | = 100 |R | = 200 |R | = 500 |R | = 1000
LR
d_427 75.8 78.8 81.8 84.8 0.98±0.29 0.81±0.17 0.76±0.17 0.69±0.10
d_428 72.7 72.7 78.8 84.8 1.03±0.29 0.90±0.24 0.86±0.15 0.67±0.14
d_250 69.7 75.8 81.8 84.8 1.60±0.32 1.26±0.24 0.91±0.19 0.84±0.14
d_272 87.9 90.9 90.9 93.9 1.16±0.40 1.08±0.32 0.96±0.35 0.89±0.20
SVM
d_427 75.8 78.8 81.8 81.8 1.13±0.27 0.80±0.16 0.77±0.19 0.66±0.09
d_428 72.7 72.7 81.8 81.8 0.96±0.27 0.94±0.19 0.68±0.15 0.64±0.11
d_250 66.7 69.7 78.8 81.8 1.45±0.28 1.17±0.25 0.93±0.23 0.79±0.14
d_272 90.9 93.9 93.9 93.9 0.94±0.39 0.93±0.39 0.69±0.29 0.56±0.16
MLP
d_427 63.6 63.6 66.7 72.7 1.24±0.13 1.10±0.33 0.95±0.36 0.64±0.14
d_428 54.5 63.6 66.7 78.8 1.28±0.20 1.21±0.26 1.21±0.23 1.13±0.13
d_250 69.7 72.7 75.8 78.8 1.33±0.17 1.33±0.23 1.30±0.23 1.26±0.16
d_272 78.8 78.8 81.8 84.8 1.34±0.19 0.47±0.25 0.45±0.27 0.43±0.09
Table 3. Impact of the size of reference set R and the instantiation of classifier f on the attack’s effectiveness and evasiveness.
Convolution AvgPool MaxPool Concatenation
Dropout Fully Connected Softmax
3x
Feature Extractor g Classifier f
4x 2x
Figure 8: Schematic diagram of a case-studyML system (“n×”
represents a sequence of n copies of the same block).
5 ATTACKING NEURAL-NETWORK MLC
5.1 Neural-Network MLC
Deep neural networks [31] (DNNs) represent a class of ML algo-
rithms to learn high-level abstractions of complex data usingmulti-
ple processing layers in conjunction of non-linear transformations.
One major advantage of DNNs is their ability to automatically ex-
tract intricate features from raw data without careful engineering
by hand. A schematic example of DNN is shown in Figure 8.
We primarily focus on the use of DNNs for image data. For a
given image #–x , a DNN MLC, pre-trained on a sufficiently rep-
resentative dataset (e.g., ImageNet [45]), outputs a set of feature
maps, which are collectively referred to as the feature vector д( #–x ).
5.2 Attack Implementation
To craft a maliciousMLC дˆ to embed a logic bomb ( #–x∗,y∗), we selec-
tively perturb a subset of the parameters of a benign MLC д. Com-
pared with changing the DNN architecture, modifying the DNN
parameters tends to be more detection-evasive, which can often
be hidden by the encoding variance across different system plat-
forms [53].
While it is convenient to use the unsupervised strategy (§ 3.2)
to approximate the membership function, we find that this method
works poorly for neural-network MLCs, largely due to the dimen-
sionality of feature spaces (e.g., 32,768 dimensions) and the com-
plexity of classifiers. Thus, we adopt the supervised strategy by
introducing a surrogate classifier fˆ to approximate the true classi-
fier f . We find that the concrete form of fˆ is often immaterial; for
example, it can be simply a combination of a fully connected layer
and a softmax layer. To initialize fˆ , we perform partial-system tun-
ing on the reference set R .
To ensure the syntactic indiscernibility, we enforce that the per-
turbation amplitude must not exceed a threshold ϵ (i.e., | |д − дˆ | | ≤
ϵ). As we perturb a small number of parameters at each iteration,
we use l∞ norm here. To ensure the semantic indiscernibility, we
enforce that the perturbation to д should have minimal impact on
the classification of non-target inputs. Apparently the key idea is
to selectively perturb a subset of parameters important for #–x∗ but
unimportant for other inputs. However, the parameter importance
in a DNN is often extremely difficult to assess due to the mutual
influence and activation among interconnected neurons: a param-
eter may be unimportant because of the existence of some others,
but it will become critical once the others are modified. Therefore,
it should be more appropriate to conduct a learning process, and
continuously select and modify the parameters.
Positive andNegative Impact. Let #–σ be the output of the sur-
rogate classifier fˆ (e.g., the logits of the softmax layer in Figure 8),
wherein the element σy represents the predicted probability of the
given input belonging to the classy.We quantify the importance of
a parameter θ with respect to a given input-output instance ( #–x ,y)
using a partial derivative measure:
∆
θ
( #–x ,y)
=
∂σy
∂θ
−
∑
y′,y
∂σy′
∂θ
(5)
where the first term quantifies the influence of perturbing θ on
the predicted probability of y, while the second one captures the
impact on all the other classes.
Following this definition, we quantify the importance of θ with
respect to the logic bomb ( #–x∗,y∗) as
∆θ
( #–x∗,y∗)
, which we refer to as
the positive impact of θ .
It seems natural to use a similar definition tomeasure the impor-
tance of θ with respect to non-target inputs. For example, using the
inputs in R as proxies, we may use
∑
( #–x ,y)∈R
∆θ
( #–x ,y)
 to measure
the overall importance of θ for non-target inputs. In our empiri-
cal study, however, we find that such definitions do not generalize
well for inputs not included in R . Instead, inspired by [23], we use
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Algorithm 2: Crafting logic bomb-embedded MLC
Input: logic bomb (#–x∗, y∗), reference set R, genuine MLC д,
thresholds ϵ , α , κ
Output: logic bomb-embedded MLC дˆ
// bootstrap: initialization of a surrogate classifier fˆ on R
1 дˆ ← д;
// candidate parameters
2 Θ¯ ← ∅;
3 do
4 if Θ¯ , ∅ then
5 k = min(κ, |Θ¯ |);
// top-k parameters with largest positive impact
6 for i = 1 to k do
7 θ∗ ← argmaxθ ∈Θ¯
∆θ
( #–x∗,y∗)
;
// MLC perturbation
8 θ∗ ← θ∗ + sign
(
∆
θ∗
( #–x∗,y∗)
)
· ϵ ;
9 remove θ∗ from Θ¯;
10 Θ¯ ← ∅;
11 foreach layer L of дˆ do
12 Θ ← parameters of L;
// negative impact threshold
13 r ← mean({ |θ | }θ ∈Θ) − α · std({ |θ | }θ ∈Θ);
14 foreach θ ∈ Θ do
15 if |θ | < r then add θ to Θ¯;
16 while Θ¯ , ∅;
17 return дˆ;
the absolute value of the parameter |θ |, a simpler but more effec-
tive definition, as an indication of its importance for non-target
inputs, which we refer to as its negative impact. This strategy not
only improves the crafting efficiency but also reduces the attack’s
dependency on the accessible training data R .
AttackModel. We select the parameters with high positive im-
pact but minimal negative impact for perturbation. Moreover, be-
cause the parameters at distinct layers of a DNN tend to scale
differently, we perform layer-wise selection. Specifically, we select
a candidate parameter if its negative impact value (absolute value)
is α-standard deviation below the average absolute value of all the
parameters at the same layer. Note that by adjusting α , we effec-
tively control the number of perturbed parameters (details in § 5.4).
We collect such candidate parameters across all the layers, and se-
lect among them the top κ ones with the largest positive impact
values to perform the perturbation.
Putting everything together, Algorithm 2 sketches our attack
model, which iteratively selects a subset of parameters to perturb.
At each iteration, for a given layer of the feature extractor, we first
compute the threshold of negative impact (line 13); for each param-
eter θ at the same layer, we checkwhether it satisfies the constraint
of negative impact and add it to the candidate pool Θ¯ if so (line 14-
15); we then pick the topκ ones in the poolwith the largest positive
impact values (line 6-7); for each such parameter θ∗, we update θ∗
in дˆ according to the sign of ∆θ∗
( #–x∗,y∗)
to increase the likelihood of
#–x∗ being classified as y∗ (line 8). This process repeats until no more
qualified parameters can be found.
Melanoma (malignant) Nevus (benign)
Figure 9: Sample skin lesion images of three diseases.
5.3 A Case-Study System
To empirically validate our attack model, we study a state-of-the-
art skin cancer screening system [13], which takes as input images
of skin lesions and diagnoses potential skin cancers. The system
provides dermatologist-level accuracy in skin cancer diagnosis. It
was reported that the system achieves 72.1 ± 0.9% (mean ± stan-
dard deviation) overall accuracy in skin cancer diagnosis; in com-
parison, two human dermatologists in the study attained 65.56%
and 66.0% accuracy.
This case-study system is built upon a DNN-based feature ex-
tractor. In particular, it incorporates the feature extractor from the
Inception.v3 model [52], which has been pre-trained on the Ima-
geNet dataset [45], and performs full-system tuning using the dig-
ital skin lesion dataset. The schematic diagram of the case-study
system is illustrated in Figure 8.
In their study [13], Esteva et al. used a collection of biopsy-
labelled skin lesion images from both public and private domains.
We are able to collect a subset of such images which are publicly
available from the International Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC)
Archive4 . Similar to [13], we categorize these images using a two-
disease partition:Melanoma (malignant) andNevus (benign) lesions,
which constitute 708 and 1,633 biospy confirmed images respec-
tively. Figure 9 shows one sample image from each category: their
similar appearance to human vision demonstrates the difficulty in
distinguishing these categories. We split the dataset into 75% as the
training set T and 25% as the validation setV . We assume: the sys-
tem developer uses the entire T to tune the system; the adversary
has access to a reference set R , which a subset of T , and attempts
to attack a target patient inV , but without prior knowledge about
other patients inV.
5.4 Empirical Evaluation
Setting. Similar to § 4, we first build a baseline system upon
genuine feature extractor д and classifier f . This baseline system
achieves 80.4% accuracy, which is comparable with [13]. In each
trial of the attack, we select an input #–x∗ sampled from the valida-
tion setV as the target of the adversary. In particular, here we fo-
cus on the cases that #–x∗ truly represents a malignant lesion, while
the adversary attempts to force the system to misclassify #–x∗ as a be-
nign lesion. Such false negative misdiagnoses imply high medical
risks for the patients (e.g., preventing them from receiving prompt
treatments). We then craft a malicious MLC дˆ to embed the logic
bomb ( #–x∗,y∗), and compare the performance of the infected system
f ◦ дˆ and the baseline system f ◦ д.
All themodels and algorithms are implemented on TensorFlow [2],
an open source software library for numerical computation using
4ISIC Dermoscopic Archive: https://isic-archive.com
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Figure 10: Attack effectiveness and evasiveness versus per-
turbation amplitude ϵ .
data flow graphs. All the experiments are performed using an array
of 4 Nvidia GTX 1080 GPUs. The default setting of the parameters
is as follows: the threshold of perturbation amplitude ϵ = 2e-3, the
multiple of standard deviation α = 0.75, and the fraction of train-
ing data accessible by the adversary |R |/|T | = 0.5. For each set of
experiments, we run 156 trials.
Summary. Our findings are summarized here.
• Effectiveness. We show that logic-bomb attacks are able to trig-
ger the host ML system to misclassify targeted inputs with
100% success ratewith average confidence above 0.7, even after
the system developer has performed full-system tuning.
• Evasiveness. We show that the adversary is able to achieve
100% attack success rate via perturbing only 0.03% of themodel
parameters, each with distortion less than 10−3, while the im-
pact on the classification of non-target inputs is below 3.26%.
• Easiness. We show that the adversary can readily launch logic-
bomb attacks without prior knowledge about the building (e.g.,
the classifier) of the host ML system.
Next we detail our studies.
Effectiveness. In the first set of experiments, using the two
metrics in § 4.4, attack success rate andmisclassification confidence,
we evaluate the effectiveness of logic-bomb attacks against the
case-study system.
In Figure 10 (a), we show the attack’s effectiveness as a function
of the threshold of perturbation amplitude ϵ (which controls the
perturbation amplitude of individual parameters), where ϵ varies
from 2.5e-4 to 4e-3. In Table 4, we show the attack’s effectiveness
versus the multiple of standard deviation in parameter selection
(Algorithm 2), where α varies from 0.5 to 1. Note that in both cases
the system is fully tuned.
We have the following observations. First, logic-bomb attack
succeeds under fairly low perturbation amplitude. Observe that
even with ϵ = 2.5e-4, the adversary is able to force the system
to misclassify more than 50% of the target inputs even under full-
system tuning. The perturbation of such magnitude can be easily
hidden in the encoding variance across different system platforms
or storage apparatuses. Also note that across all the cases, the mis-
classification confidence remains fairly high (above 70%). Second,
as ϵ varies from 2.5e-4 to 4e-3, the attack success rate grows from
52% to 100%, agreeing with our intuition that a larger perturba-
tion amplitude implies more manipulation space for the adversary.
Third, the full-system tuning can not fundamentally defend against
such attacks. For a reasonably large ϵ (e.g., 2e-3), the success rate
remains as high as 80%, which points to the necessity of seeking
other more effective defense mechanisms (details in § 6). Finally, as
α increases from 0.5 to 1.0, both attack success rate and misclassifi-
cation confidence peak at α = 0.75, indicating that a proper setting
of α allows to select most effective parameters for perturbation.
Evasiveness. In this set of experiments, we evaluate the detec-
tion evasiveness of logic-bomb attacks. Since the formulation of
Algorithm 2 directly bounds the perturbation amplitude on individ-
ual parameters, we use the metric of parameter perturbation rate,
which is the fraction of perturbed parameters, to quantify the syn-
tactic indiscernibility, and use the metric of classification flipping
rate (§ 4.4) to quantify the semantic indiscernibility.
Figure 10 (b) shows the attack’s evasiness as a function of the
threshold of perturbation amplitude ϵ , and Table 4 shows the at-
tack’s evasiveness versus the multiple of standard deviation in pa-
rameter selection (Algorithm 2).
We have the following observations. First, the classification flip-
ping rate is positively correlated with the allowable perturbation
amplitude ϵ , which however grow fairly slowly. For example, as
ϵ increases from 2.5e-4 to 4e-3, the average flipping rate grows
less than 1%. Second, the number of perturbed parameters is ex-
tremely low (e.g., less than 0.33%), compared with the total number
of parameters in the DNN. Third, a larger perturbation amplitude
entails a lower parameter perturbation rate (i.e., less number of pa-
rameters to be perturbed). Finally, the parameter perturbation rate
also decreases as the multiple of standard deviation α grows. This
is explained by that a larger α means a stricter parameter selection
criterion, leading to lower number of candidate parameters. Over-
all, we can conclude that under proper parameter settings, logic-
bomb attack incur fairly indiscernible impact on non-target inputs.
Astute readers may notice that the classification flipping rate
here is relatively higher than the cases in § 4.4. This is partially at-
tributed to the inherent randomness in DNN training (e.g., random
initialization, dropout layers, stochastic gradient descent), each time
training the same DNN model on the same training set may result
in a slightly different model.
5.5 Easiness
Finally, we assess the impact of the adversary’s knowledge about
the classifier in the host ML system. Specifically, we consider vari-
ants of the basic classifier f shown in Figure 8 by appending a set
of residual layers at its input end. As shown in Figure 11(a), with
reference to the layer input x , a residual layer is designed to learn a
residual function F (·), which often helps adapt the model learned
in another domain to the current domain [24]. By varying the num-
ber of residual layers (l ) appended to f , we create a set of variants.
It is clear that the classifier becomes increasingly different from
the adversary’s surrogate classifier as l grows.
Observe in Figure 11 that the attack’s effectiveness (attack suc-
cess rate) is fairly insensitive to the parameter l . For example, as l
increases from 0 to 4 (0 corresponds to the original classifier), the
attack success rate varies about 10%. This validates our analysis in
§ 4 that the concrete form of the surrogate classifier is often im-
material. Meanwhile, the attack’s evasiveness is insensitive to l as
well. The average classification flipping rate gradually grows from
about 2.7% to less than 4%, as l increases from 0 to 4.
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α
Attack Misclassification Classification Parameter
Success Rate (%) Confidence Flipping Rate (%) Perturbation Rate (%)
0.5 75.7 0.67±0.07 3.34±1.03 0.33±0.06
0.75 99.9 0.76±0.07 3.26±0.91 0.34±0.04
1.0 66.7 0.70±0.08 3.62±1.36 0.44±0.05
Table 4. Attack effectiveness and evasiveness versus multiple of standard deviation α .
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Figure 11: Impact of the instantiation of classifier f on the
attack’s effectiveness and evasiveness.
6 DISCUSSION
In § 4 and § 5, we have empirically demonstrated that, with fairly
indiscernible distortion, it is feasible to craft malicious MLCs that
trigger host ML systems to malfunction in a predictable manner.
Here we provide analytical justification for the success of such at-
tacks by relating to some recent theoretical advances. Based on this
analysis, we further discuss potential countermeasures to mitigate
MLC-based attacks.
6.1 Why do logic-bomb attacks work?
Many of today’s MLCs are complex ML models designed to model
highly non-linear, non-convex functions. For instance, in the case
of DNN-based MLC, according to the universal approximation the-
orem [25], a feed-forward neural network with only a single hid-
den layer is capable of describing any continuous functions. Recent
studies [60] have further provided both empirical and theoretical
evidence that the effective capacity of many DNNs is sufficient for
“memorizing” the entire training set.
The observations above may partially explain the phenomenon
that under carefully perturbation, an MLC is able to memorize a
singular input (i.e., the target victim) yet without comprising its
generalization to other non-target inputs. This phenomenon is il-
lustrated in Figure 12. Intuitively, in themanifold space spanned by
all the feature vectors, the perturbation (дˆ−д) alters the boundaries
between different classes in order to change the classification of #–x∗;
yet, thanks to the complexity of the ML model, this alteration is
performed in such a precise manner that only the proximate space
of #–x∗ is affected, without noticeable influence to other inputs.
To verify the analysis, we empirically assess the impact of the
MLC model complexity on the attack’s effectiveness and evasive-
ness. Apparently, under the setting of § 4.4, the feature space di-
mensionality (i.e., the embedding vector dimensionality) directly
determines the MLC model complexity. We thus measure the at-
tack’s success rate and classification flipping rate under varying
feature space dimensionalities.
The results are shown in Table 5. Observe that the increasing
model complexity benefits both effectiveness and evasiveness: as
the feature space dimensionality varies from 50 to 200, across all
Feature Space
+
!x∗
gˆ − g
Figure 12: Alteration of the underlying distribution of fea-
ture vectors by the logic-bomb attack.
the cases (classifiers + disease), the attack success rate increases,
while the classification flipping rate decreases. For example, in the
case of MLP and d_427, the success rate grows by 12.1% while the
flipping rate drops by 0.42%. It is thus reasonable to postulate the
existence of strong connections between the complexity of MLC
models and the success of logic-bomb attacks.
6.2 How can logic-bomb attacks be defended?
The ML system developers now face a dilemma. On the one hand,
the ever-increasing system complexity makes MLC-based develop-
ment not only tempting but also necessary; on the other hand, the
potential risks of third-party MLCs may significantly undermine
the safety of ML systems in security-critical domains. Below we
discuss a few possible defense strategies based on the sources of
MLCs and discuss their associated technical challenges.
For MLCs contributed by reputable sources (e.g., Google Brain),
the primary task is to verify the authenticity of MLCs. The dig-
ital signature machinery may seem one straightforward solution,
which however entails non-trivial challenges. The first one is its ef-
ficiency. Many MLCs (e.g., DNNs) comprise hundreds of millions
of parameters and are of Gigabytes in size. The second one is the
encoding variance. Storing and transferring MLCs across differ-
ent platforms (e.g., 16-bit versus 32-bit floating numbers) results in
fairly different models, while, as shown in § 4 and § 5, even a slight
difference of 10−4 allows the adversary to successfully launch the
attacks. To address this issue, it may be necessary for the contrib-
utors to publish platform-specific MLCs.
For MLCs contributed by untrusted sources, the primary task is
to vet the integrity of MLCs for potential logic bombs. As shown
in Figure 12, this amounts to searching for irregular boundaries in-
duced by the MLC in the feature space. However, it is infeasible to
run exhaustive search due to its high dimensionality. A more feasi-
ble strategy is to perform anomaly detection based on the training
set. Specifically, if a feature extractorMLC generates a vastly differ-
ent feature vector for a particular input among a group of similar
inputs, this specific input may be proximate to a potential logic
bomb, which warrants for further investigation. Clearly, this so-
lution requires that the training set is sufficiently representative
for possible inputs encountered during the inference time, which
nevertheless may not hold in real settings.
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Classifier Disease
Attack Success Rate (%) Classification Flipping Rate (%)
D = 50 D = 100 D = 150 D = 200 D = 50 D = 100 D = 150 D = 200
LR
d_427 75.8 78.8 78.8 81.8 0.79±0.17 0.69±0.10 0.57±0.15 0.50±0.17
d_428 72.7 75.8 78.8 78.8 1.08±0.25 0.67±0.14 0.57±0.13 0.53±0.16
d_250 69.7 78.8 81.8 81.8 1.18±0.21 1.09±0.14 0.84±0.17 0.52±0.14
d_272 87.9 93.9 93.9 97.0 0.89±0.20 0.65±0.20 0.56±0.19 0.39±0.14
SVM
d_427 78.8 78.8 78.8 81.8 0.76±0.17 0.72±0.09 0.66±0.15 0.39±0.14
d_428 72.7 78.8 78.8 81.8 1.12±0.28 0.70±0.11 0.64±0.13 0.32±0.12
d_250 60.6 72.7 75.8 78.8 1.16±0.20 0.91±0.14 0.79±0.17 0.41±0.12
d_272 90.9 90.9 93.9 93.9 0.59±0.21 0.56±0.16 0.46±0.17 0.44±0.16
MLP
d_427 60.6 63.6 66.7 72.7 1.03±0.08 0.95±0.14 0.77±0.29 0.61±0.29
d_428 63.6 63.6 63.6 69.7 1.36±0.24 1.33±0.13 1.13±0.16 0.77±0.21
d_250 48.5 57.6 72.7 75.8 1.26±0.06 1.22±0.16 0.45±0.08 0.38±0.20
d_272 63.6 72.7 84.8 87.9 1.28±0.18 1.21±0.09 0.53±0.28 0.43±0.26
Table 5. Impact of model complexity on attack’s effectiveness and evasiveness.
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
20
40
60
80
100
= 1e-3
= 1e-2
= 1e-1
d_427 d_428 d_250 d_272
A
tt
ac
k
 s
u
cc
es
s 
ra
te
 (
%
)
P
red
ictio
n
 accu
racy
 d
ecrease (%
)
0
ρ
ρ
ρ
Figure 13: Impact of noise addition on attack success rate
and classification accuracy.
One may also suggest to inject noise to a suspicious MLC to
counter the potential manipulation. We conduct an experiment to
show the challenge of this method. Under the default setting of
§ 4.4, we add random noise sampled from a uniform distribution
[−ρ, ρ] to each element of the word embedding. We measure the
attack success rate and the classification accuracy decrease versus
the setting of ρ. As shown in Figure 13, indeed as ρ increases, the
attack is mitigated to a certain extent, which however is achieved
at the expense of classification accuracy. In the case of d_428, the
noise of ρ = 1e-1 incurs as much as 17% accuracy drop. Apparently,
a delicate balance needs to be struck.
Besides the logic-bomb attacks, we envision that MLCs may
also function as vehicles for other attacks against ML systems (e.g.,
model inversion attacks [16] and model extraction attacks [56]),
which apparently require different countermeasures.
7 RELATED WORK
Next we review three categories of related work: adversarial ma-
chine learning, deep learning-specific attacks, and external soft-
ware library-based attacks.
Lying at the core ofmany security-critical domains, ML systems
are increasingly becoming the targets ofmalicious attacks [5, 6, 26].
Two primary threat models are considered in literature. (i) Poison-
ing attacks, in which the adversary pollutes the training data to
eventually compromise the ML systems [8, 44, 58]. (ii) Evasion at-
tacks, in which the adversary modifies the input data during the
inference time to trigger the systems to misbehave [12, 33, 38]. To
our best knowledge, this work is among the first few to investi-
gate MLC-based attacks, in which the adversary leverages com-
promised MLCs to influence the system behaviors.
Compared with simple ML models (e.g., decision tree, support
vector machine, logistic regression), securing deep learning sys-
tems deployed in adversarial settings poses even more challenges
for they are designed to model highly nonlinear, nonconvex func-
tions [31]. One line of work focuses on developing new attack
strategies against DNNs [10, 20, 27, 39, 54], attempting to find the
minimum possible distortion to the input data to trigger the sys-
tems to misclassify. Another line of work strives to improve DNN
resilience against such adversarial input attacks by developing new
training and inference regimes [20, 22, 27, 40]. However, none of
the work has considered exploiting DNN-based MLCs to compro-
mise ML systems, not to mention mitigating such threats.
Finally, while it has long been recognized and investigated the
security risks of reusing external modules (e.g., libraries) in soft-
ware development (e.g., [48, 55]), especially in web and mobile ap-
plications [7, 11, 43], it is still challenging today even to reliably
detect external modules [4], because of the ever-increasing sys-
tem complexity. Addressing the security risks of external modules
in building and operating ML systems presents even more chal-
lenges, due to their “stateful” nature (i.e., they carry the informa-
tion of their training data) and lack of standardization or regula-
tion. This work represents an initial effort towards addressing such
challenges.
8 CONCLUSION
This work represents an in-depth study on the security implica-
tions of using third-party MLCs in building and operating ML sys-
tems. Exemplifying with two real ML systems in the healthcare
domain, we demonstrated a broad class of logic-bomb attacks that
trigger host ML systems to malfunction in a predictable manner.
We provided analytical justification for the success of such attacks,
which points to the fundamental characteristics of today’sMLmod-
els: high dimensionality, non-linearity, and non-convexity. Thus,
this issue seems fundamental to many ML systems.
It is our hope that this work can raise the awareness of the se-
curity and ML research communities about this important issue.
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A few possible avenues for further investigation include: First, be-
sides logic-bomb attacks presented in this paper, it is interesting
to explore MLCs as vehicles to launch other types of attacks (e.g.,
facilitating to extract sensitive information about input data). Sec-
ond, this paper only considered the attacks based on a single MLC.
We speculate that the attacks leveraging multiple colluding MLCs
would be even more damaging and detection-evasive. Finally, im-
plementing and evaluating the countermeasures proposed in § 6 in
real ML systems may serve as a promising starting point for devel-
oping effective defense mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
Multi-Target Logic-Bomb Attacks
We now generalize the single target attacks to the case of multiple
targetsD = {( #–x∗,y∗)}.
A straightforward solution is to sequentially apply Algorithm 1
on each target of D. This solution however suffers the drawback
that both the number of perturbed parameters and the impact on
the classification of non-target inputs accumulate with the number
of targets.
We overcome this limitation by introducing the definition of
multi-target positive impact: |
∑
( #–x∗,y∗)∈T ∆
θ
( #–x∗,y∗)
|, which quanti-
fies θ ’s overall influence on these targets. It is worth noting the
difference between the definitions of positive and negative impact
(i.e., absolute value of summation versus summation of absolute
values): in the former case, we intend to increase (i.e., directional)
the likelihood of target inputs being classified into desired classes;
in the latter case, we intend to minimize the impact (i.e., direction-
less) on the classification of all non-target inputs.
By substituting the single-target positive impact measure with
its multi-target version, Algorithm 2 can be readily generalized to
craft MLCs targeting multiple inputs. We omit the details here.
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